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Peirce’s Reception in Japan
Shigeyuki Atarashi
1 In  Japan,  the  number  of  investigations  of  Charles  Sanders  Peirce’s  philosophy  has
recently increased. In this article, we can focus only on a few instances of the research
movement in Japan that  has put  Peirce’s  ideas at  its  center.  However,  even such a
limited survey shows that Peirce’s work has affected various Japanese academic areas.
In this paper we talk about three types of Japanese studies of Peirce’s pragmatism:
discussions of Peirce’s theory of abduction,
examinations of Peirce’s theory of signs,
cosmological considerations of Peirce’s pragmatism.
 
1. Discussions of Abduction
2 Peirce regards not only induction but also abduction as a synthetic inference to draw a
conclusion concerning a fact not involved in the premises. Basically, researchers use
the following formula for abduction:
The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true (EP2: 231).
3 This style of inference is the fallacy of affirming the consequent. On the other hand,
Peirce asserts a perceptual judgment is an abductive one. Then, a perceptual judgment
is an antecedent of some implication and followed by a surprising fact,  which is its
consequent. But we cannot specify what kind of fact it is from the form of the fallacy of
affirming  the  consequent.  Are  we  able  to  comprehend  the  nature  of  an  abductive
inference  only  by  means  of  the  fallacy  of  affirming  the  consequent?  Japanese
researchers, with this fundamental problem of abduction in mind, are elucidating the
logical  structure  of  abduction  by  throwing  light  on  the  conditions  that  enable
abduction  to  fulfill  its  role  in  inquiry.  Some  researchers  lay  more  stress  on  the
abductive function of  adopting hypotheses  to  explain why observed facts  occurred.
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M is, for instance, PI, PII, PIII, and PIV;
S is PI, PII, PIII, and PIV:
S is M. (CP1: 559)
4 According to this, we discover strong similarities between two objects and grasp one
with the concept applied to the other in abduction. This indicates the way in which we
form a perceptual judgment through an abductive process.  (Atarashi 2011; Ito 1985;
Murakami  2012;  Yonemori  2007;  Akagawa  2011;  Muranaka  2006;  Muranaka  2010;
Muranaka 2012).
5 There are also studies that focus on how the notions of abduction can be applied in
particular  fields.  One  of  these  aims  to  introduce  abductive  inquiries  into  learning
activities at elementary or middle schools (Sugita – Kuwabara 2013; Yunoki 2007). In
accordance with the above formula of abduction, first of all, children have to be aware
of surprising facts. The kind of facts that is surprising depends on the child’s interest.
The gaps between the child’s knowledge and the facts observed by the child make them
surprising. But in the Japanese system of education, teachers must conduct classes with
textbooks specified by their schools in fixed classrooms (in Japan, children study in one
classroom  and  do  not  move  to  other  classrooms,  except  for  special  subjects,  for
instance,  music  and  physical  education).  It  is  necessary  for  the  teacher  to  direct
children’s attentions toward particular facts that are worth examining in terms of their
curriculum. Because of this, the teacher, for example, occasionally takes the children
out of their classroom and stimulates them so that they can concentrate on the facts
being studied. By asking the children why a fact occurred, the teacher encourages them
to think about hypotheses to explain it, i.e., the antecedents of certain implications that
would be followed by the fact as their consequent. It is important to recognize that
there are several possible antecedents. In their classroom, children are divided in small
groups,  present  their  own opinions  in  the  groups,  and  take  ideas  that  seem to  be
plausible  from  them.  The  teacher  advises  that  they  should  trace  the  processes  of
deriving the fact in question from their chosen ideas step by step. Then, in front of the
whole class, the children give presentations about them to other members and discuss
various possibilities with each other from wider viewpoints, so they may arrive at a
hypothesis with which all of them finally agree. Here, it is crucial that they have the
perspective  of  fallibilism.  They  examine  more  closely  the  connection  between  a
hypothesis and a fact and search for the other consequences from the hypothesis to
confirm its validity. If they do not successfully accomplish this investigation, then they
will find themselves in a situation where they need to think of a new hypothesis for the
fact. Such an abductive inquiry is very difficult for children and takes a lot of time. But
learning activities based on abduction are meaningful especially in Japanese schools
because  the  ways  of  teaching  adopted  in  most  Japanese  schools  is  basically
indoctrination,  which  tends  to  suppress  children’s  imaginative  ideas.  From  an
educational point of view, therefore, abduction is the foundation of children’s heuristic
learning activities, and children can cultivate their abilities to create new ideas on the
basis  of  acquired knowledge  by  studying the  structure  of  abductive  inferences  and
using them practically.
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2. Examinations of Peirce’s Theory of Signs
6 Other  researchers  are  more  interested  in  Peirce’s  theory  of  signs  (Arima  2014;
Yonemori 1981). Some of them compare Peirce’s conceptions of signs with Saussure’s
and reveal the features peculiar to Peirce’s theory of signs. Peirce’s classification of
signs is more exhaustive and comprehensive. According to one researcher, Peirce did
not introduce the distinction between langue and parole into his theory of signs (Maeda
2006). But this researcher regards Legisign as langue because a Legisign is a sign that
possesses  a  potentiality  as  a  law.  This  researcher  incorporates  parole into  Peirce’s
classification of signs by identifying Dicisigns that are propositions describing facts as a
realization  of  Legisigns through Symbols and  Rhemes that  represent  certain  kinds  of
possible objects. He suggests that Peirce’s theory of signs provides us with an important
perspective on the treatment of difficulties which Saussure confronted concerning the
notion of langue.
7 Another researcher points out that one of the differences between Peirce’s theory of
signs and Saussure’s is as follows: Peirce’s conceptions of signs can be applied not only
to  human  activities  but  also  to  semiotic  processes  of  other  creatures  and  physical
phenomena,  whereas  Saussure’s  semiotics  focuses  on  the  developments  of  human
languages and human cultures (Egawa 2011). Since Peirce terms his own position as an
evolutionary  cosmology,  Peirce’s  theory  of  signs  is  a  cosmological  interpretation  of
semiotic events occurring in the universe. This researcher concludes that Peirce tried
to characterize objects represented by signs as evolutionary realities by grasping the
dynamic  aspects  of  the  interrelations  of  signs,  objects,  and  the  interpretants  that
combine them.
8 Other researchers scrutinize the effect of Peirce’s theory of signs on the theory of the
photograph.  According  to  Peirce,  a  photograph  is  an  index,  and  it  is  a  sign  that
represents its object by virtue of being connected with it as a matter of fact. In other
words, a photograph represents its object on the basis of the fact that it is the effect of
light reflecting from the object. But some photographs convey no information on their
objects and do not play the role as index any longer. Is Peirce’s understanding of the
photograph  wrong?  One  researcher  replies  “no”  and  gives  the  definition  of  a
photograph as follows: a photograph is an image which retains the indexical function
(Ogura  2013).  From  this  standpoint,  we  may  say  that  digital  technology  deprives
photographs of indexicality. For instance, computer-generated images can be produced
without  physical  causal  connections with the objects  they represent  irrespective of
whether such objects actually exist. Thanks to digital technology, we are able to create
computer-generated  images  as  if  they  were  photographs.  In  the  digital  age,  some
photographs maintain no indexicality but work as icons: in fact, Peirce characterizes an
icon as a sign which denotes its object by virtue of its own characteristics independent
of the reality of the object. Since Peirce insists that an index involves a sort of icon, an
iconic  computer-generated  image  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  degenerated  form  of
photograph. Thus,  Peirce’s  theory of  signs still  presents an effective perspective on
photographs and their surroundings in the digital age.
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3. Cosmological Considerations of Peirce’s
Pragmatism
9 Peirce’s  theory  of  the  universe  is  interpreted  as  an  evolutionary  cosmology.
Researchers argue that Peirce’s view is characterized by 1) the plastic notion of the
universe as the product of growth, 2) tychism, which means that the growing universe
involves  the  action  of  absolute  chance  and  is  freed  from  complete  regularity,  3)
objective idealism,  which equates matter with effete mind and identifies rigidly fixed
habits as physical laws, 4) synechism, which asserts that the evolution of the universe is
the process of  the growth of  a  continuum where a new continuum comes to being
through  a  discontinuity  that  occurs  in  the  existing  continuum  by  chance,  and  5)
agapism, which emphasizes the circular movement of creative love in evolution where
organisms live in harmony with other organisms by sacrificing their own perfection to
the  perfectionment  of  other  organisms  (Atarashi  2011;  Ito  2006).  Hence,  Peirce’s
evolutionary cosmology is the theory of the evolutionary growth of the universe from
its  birth  on  the  basis  of  the  logic  of  the  operation  of  absolute  chance  and  habits
formation. As Peirce’s theory of categories is grounded in his logic of relatives, Peirce
stresses the logical structures of all events in the evolutionary universe. We may call
Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology the metaphysics of the logic of evolution. Accordingly,
in the light of Peircean cosmology, we may state that logic is not only the process of
reasoning but also the fundamental mode of being and the logic of modality lies at the
root of the evolutionary universe.
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